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Transferring Collective Knowledge: Collective and Fragmented Teaching and Learning
in the Chinese Auto Industry
Abstract
Collective knowledge, consisting of tacit group-embedded knowledge, is a key element
of organizational capabilities. This study undertakes a multiple-case study of the transfer of
collective knowledge, guided by a set of tentative constructs and propositions derived from
organizational learning theory. By focusing on the group-embeddedness dimension of
collective knowledge, we direct our attention to the source and recipient communities. We
identify two sets of strategic choices concerning the transfer of collective knowledge: collective
vs. fragmented teaching, and collective vs. fragmented learning. The empirical context of this
study is international R&D capability transfer in the Chinese auto industry. From the case
evidence, we find the expected benefits of collective teaching and collective learning, and also
discover additional benefits of these two strategies, including the creation of a bridge network
communication infrastructure. The study disclosed other conditions underlying the choice of
strategies of transferring collective knowledge, including transfer effort and the level of group-
embeddedness of the knowledge to be taught or re-embedded. The paper provides a group-level
perspective in understanding organizational capabilities, as well as a set of refined constructs
and propositions concerning strategic choices of transferring collective knowledge. The study
also provides a rich description of the best practices and lessons learned in transferring
organizational capabilities.
Keywords:  knowlege transfer, collective knowledge, organizational capabilities, R&D
capabilities, organizational learning, network, ChinaWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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Transferring Collective Knowledge: Collective and Fragmented Teaching and Learning in
the Chinese Auto Industry
Organizational knowledge and knowledge transfer have emerged as central themes of
managerial theories and practices. A large volume of theoretical and empirical work exists in
both areas (Argote & Ingram, 2000a; Argyris & Schon, 1978; Brown & Duguid, 1998; Conner &
Prahalad, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Levitt & March, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Nonaka
& Takeuchi, 1995; Polanyi, 1962). Notwithstanding significant progress in our understanding of
organizational knowledge and knowledge transfer, many under-explored areas remain. One area
that is especially in need of timely research is the transfer of collective knowledge (i.e. tacit
group-embedded knowledge), which is a key component of organizational capabilities and is
highly difficult to transfer (Cook & Brown, 1999; Kogut et al., 1992; Spender, 1996).
In recent decades, both inter- and intra-firm transfer of various kinds of collective
knowledge have been practiced increasingly in the field and have caught the attention of growing
numbers of researchers. Transfer activities that have been studied include intra-organizational
spread of best practices (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Kostova, 1998; Szulanski, 1996), cross-
boarder transfer of R&D management among multinational firms’ subsidiaries (Inkpen & Dinur,
1998), and inter-alliance partner transfer of know-how (Brewer & Nollen, 1998; Singh, 1995).
Most of these studies focus on the effects of contextual constraints or endowments (such as
absorptive capacity, transfer intent, relational capital and country-level factors) on the outcome
of the transfer activities. Among the few empirical studies that address the strategic actions for
inter-communal transfer of collective knowledge, there is little systematic analysis and
theoretical generalization of the empirical findings.
The goal of this study is to advance the inquiry of knowledge transfer by identifying and
theorizing the strategic actions of transferring collective knowledge. The research question is
“what strategic teaching and learning mechanisms enable effective inter-communal transfer of
collective knowledge?” The research approach is a theory-guided exploratory multiple-case
study, which starts from epistemological discussions of collective knowledge and requirements
for its transfer, and moves on to field investigations to inductively develop a theory of the
strategic factors that lead to effective transfer of collective knowledge. This approach allows
recombination of insights from both previous theories and empirical findings of this study.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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We selected the activities of western multinational enterprises (MNEs) that are
transferring R&D managerial practices to their operations in the Chinese auto industry as the
empirical setting, for four reasons. First, R&D management in auto industry is highly complex
and has a large portion of collective knowledge content. Second, there are growing evidences of
transferring R&D capabilities from MNEs to operations in that industry. Third, because the
source units are from industrial developed countries and the recipient units are from China, the
cultural, technical and managerial differences between the source and recipient organizations are
similar across the cases (Beamish, 1993; Child and Yan, 2001), and provide a similar contextual
setting for the study. Fourth, evidence from previous fieldwork suggests that the cross-case
knowledge transfer choices exhibits sufficient variation to identify useful relationships.
The findings from a theory-building multiple-case study based on field investigations of
four exemplar international joint ventures extend the knowledge transfer theories by deriving a
set of empirically valid generalizable propositions. The rich and in-depth descriptions of the
findings and the general propositions may also provide helpful empirical implications for the
practitioners who participate in the transfer of organizational capabilities that have significant
collective knowledge content.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
Among many dimensions of organizational knowledge, tacit vs. explicit and individual-
carried vs. group-embedded are the two most salient dimensions in the management field (Cook
et al., 1999; Kogut et al., 1992; Nonaka et al., 1995; Spender, 1996). The type of knowledge that
is both tacit and group-embedded is termed as collective knowledge
1 by Spender (Spender,
1996), and as organizational genres by Cook and Brown (Cook et al., 1999). Collective
knowledge reveals itself in many forms, such as norms, values and mental maps (Hedberg, 1981;
Levitt et al., 1988), uncodified routines, and organizing principles of interactions (Argote et al.,
2000a; Kogut et al., 1992; Nelson et al., 1982), uncodified architectural knowledge (Henderson
& Clark, 1990), and transactive memory or collective interpretive scheme (Daft & Weick, 1984;
Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Levitt et al., 1988; Wegner, 1987). Among the four knowledge combinations
that the tacit vs. explicit and individual-carried vs. group-embedded dimensions categorize,
collective knowledge (i.e., the tacit and group-embedded combination) is the hardest to transfer,
due to its tacit and group-embedded nature, and provides a primary source of sustainable
competitive advantage and high value-added “Penrose rents” (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993;William Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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Dierickx et al., 1989; Penrose, 1959; Spender, 1996). Firm capabilities, such as R&D
capabilities, are a mixture of all four knowledge combinations. However, it is the collective
knowledge content that gives the most strategic value to the capability.
 In this study we focus on the collective knowledge within organizational capabilities and
its transfer across communal boundaries. To do so, we consider both the tacitness and group-
embeddedness characteristics of collective knowledge.
Considering the tacit aspect of collective knowledge, it has long been established that
stable and close contacts must be developed between the transferor and the transferee in order to
transfer tacit knowledge. This usually calls for the transferor and the transferee to conduct certain
shared practices or joint projects, which facilitate close person-to-person contacts and sufficient
periods of learning-by-doing (Arrow, 1962; Brown et al., 1998; Levitt et al., 1988; Nonaka et al.,
1995; Polanyi, 1962). In the practice of transferring R&D capabilities, both the source and
recipient organizations usually engage in joint R&D projects, which serve as platforms for
transferring tacit capabilities, which cannot be fully conveyed by verbal or written media (BIC
1992). Nevertheless, learning-by-doing through joint practices is only a necessary condition for
transferring collective knowledge, not sufficient, because it alone does not resolve the difficulty
of transferring collective knowledge arising from group-embeddedness.
The group-embedded aspect of collective knowledge, unlike the tacit aspect, has not been
systematically addressed in the previous theoretical and empirical works of knowledge transfer.
Spender & Grant (1996:7) note that “The surge of interest on organizational capabilities and
competences has directed attention to organizationally embedded knowledge, but has made only
limited progress in understanding its anatomy and creation.” The main task of this study is to
address the transfer of collective knowledge with an emphasis on its group-embedded nature.
The key consideration for transferring group-embedded knowledge is that the knowing
entity of the group-embedded knowledge is not individuals or the simple sum of the individuals.
Instead, it is a group or a community. Collective knowledge, such as routines, involves systems
of coordinating relations among members of the knowing community, and is at least partly
independent of the individual members who execute them and is capable of surviving
considerable turnover in individuals (Levitt et al., 1988; Nelson et al., 1982). “The body of
knowledge is possessed by the group as a whole and is drawn on in its actions, just as knowledge
possessed by an individual is drawn on in his or her actions” (Cook et al., 1999:386) . TheWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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transfer of collective knowledge is in general an inter-communal activity, which involves and
goes one level beyond mere interpersonal knowledge transfer (Brown et al., 1998). There are two
communities involved in the transfer of collective knowledge: the source community, which is
the irreducible knowing entity of the targeted collective knowledge, and the recipient community,
in which the targeted collective knowledge is to be adaptively re-embedded.
Collective Teaching vs. Individual Teaching
Because tacit and group-embedded knowledge resides in collective mental maps,
behavioral norms, and tacit interaction routines among members, the knowledge can only reveal
itself by being brought to play in specific circumstances, in which the members of the knowing
source community interact among each other to carry out certain routines or solve certain
problems (Fiol et al., 1985; Levitt et al., 1988; Nelson et al., 1982). Hence, in order for a member
of the recipient community to learn this type of knowledge, he or she may need to participate in
the ongoing activities of the source community and even become its quasi-member. Observing
and participating in the routine work of the source community can allow each learner to not only
absorb the knowledge carried by individual teachers, but also knowledge embedded among them.
Becoming embedded in the source community can also socialize the learners with the source
community’s coding scheme, value system, norms, and mental maps, which are important part of
source community’s collective knowledge and source organization’s capabilities (Nonaka et al.,
1995). This embedded participation of a knowledge recipient in the source community enables
the recipient to be taught by the entire source community. We term this teaching strategy as
collective teaching.
In contrast to collective teaching, another type of teaching implies that the members of
the recipient community do not receive the opportunities of embedded participation in the source
community. Instead, members of the recipient community are instructed or supervised by
individual expatriates from the source community in a discrete manner. We term this type of
teaching as fragmented teaching. Fragmented teaching by the members of the source community
may not bring the collective knowledge to the members of the recipient community. Teece
(1986: 20) notes that “…it will often not suffice to transfer individuals. While a single individual
may sometimes hold the key to much organizational knowledge, group support is often needed,
since organizational routines may need to be transferred” (Teece, 1986:20). Based on this
discussion, we frame the following orienting proposition to guide further field investigations.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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Orienting Proposition 1: Collective teaching is more effective than fragmented teaching
for inter-communal transfer of collective knowledge.
Collective Learning vs. Fragmented Learning
In the last section, we discussed teaching strategies (i.e., collective and fragmented
teaching) that deal with how the source community teaches individual members of the recipient
community. In this section, we consider learning strategies, which address how the recipient
community can adapt and re-embed the individual learning of its members.
Learning activities in an organization can happen at three different levels: organization,
group, and individual (Inkpen, 1997; Tiemessen, Lane, Crossan, & Inkpen, 1997). Group or
organizational-level learning implies adapting and embedding individual-level inferences from
history into group-level routines, norms, rules, procedures, conventions, frameworks, paradigms,
codes, cultures, and technologies, around which organizations construct themselves and through
which they operate (Levitt et al., 1988). Moreover, the group-level is situated and distributed
(Araujo, 1998; Lave & Wenger, 1991), while much learning takes place in groups (Brown et al.,
1998). Researchers often take a rather insular view of learning, however, by focusing on the
individual level of learning (Argote, Ingram, Levine, & Moreland, 2000b), while the importance
of group perspective in learning is often neglected (Tiemessen et al., 1997:383).
We define collective learning as a learning strategy in which members of the recipient
community learn interactively as a community, as well as learning individually. In this view, a
group-level knowledge base such as routines and transactive memory forms during the learning
process. We note that collective learning may occur while the source community engages in
either collective teaching or individual teaching. In other words, collective teaching and learning
are two orthogonal strategic options concerning the transfer of collective knowledge.
In contrast to collective learning, another learning strategy is for members of the recipient
community to be trained in a discrete manner over different time periods and/or in different
places. We term this discrete learning strategy as fragmented learning. Based on this discussion,
we propose the following orienting proposition to guide further field exploration.
Orienting Proposition 2: Collective learning is more effective than fragmented learning




The underlying research design of this study is a multiple-case study for theory-building
based on the “blueprints” of a priori proposed constructs and tentative propositions, derived
from literature review and previous field visits. The strength of using the inductive case method
is significant when (1) “how” or “why” questions are posed, (2) causal links are complex, or (3)
the main goal of the study is to generate novel theory that is empirically valid and testable
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The multiple-case design also permits analytic generalization and replication
logic (Yin, 1994). The case study method can be especially revealing for resource-based and
knowledge-based research topics, because of its ability to reach the depth and cover the breath of
managerial intentions and mechanisms related to organizational resources and capabilities
(Almeida & Grant, 1998; Brewer et al., 1998; Inkpen et al., 1998; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Rouse
& Daellenbach, 1999).
In establishing the theoretical function, we identified two sets of strategic options in
transferring collective knowledge, “collective teaching” vs. “fragmented teaching” and
“collective learning” vs. “fragmented learning”. Prior research, however, has not thoroughly
operationalized their specific dimensions, empirical implications, and relationships with the
effectiveness of capability transfer activities, so that there is an opportunity for inductive
development from the case study.
Because R&D capability transfer provides the empirical setting to study the transfer of
collective knowledge, we take individual R&D capability transfer practice as the unit of analysis.
Although collective knowledge is not the entire composition of R&D capabilities, by probing the
interview questions specifically toward the collective content of R&D capabilities, we were able
to solicit relevant field data.
Data Collection
Case selection of this study derived from three principles: (1) theoretical sampling, i.e.,
cases were chosen for replication or extension of the emergent theory, not for statistical
randomization purposes (Eisenhardt, 1989), (2) maximization of variance in constructs, and (3)
capitalization on personal relationships between the first author and the key respondents from
companies studied to ensure interview access and high quality of data (Inkpen, 1997). We use a
single industry, the Chinese auto industry (see Appendix I for details), to provide greater controlWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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over industry-level factors. Because the constructs are general across industries, we expect
generalizability of the final outcomes of this study to go beyond this industry setting.
We conducted data collection in three stages. During the first stage, which took place in
the summer of 2000, the first author conducted an initial field study, which involved open-ended
interviews with thirty-one respondents from nine companies in the Chinese auto industry. These
companies are international joint ventures that had conducted R&D capability transfer. The main
purpose of this stage was to understand the context and develop initial framing of constructs and
tentative relationships among constructs.
The second stage of the fieldwork, an in-depth case study, took place during the summer
of 2001. More focused semi-open questions were administered to twenty-one respondents from
four companies. Each of the four companies had conducted multiple R&D capability transfer
events and applied all four types of transfer strategies (i.e., collective and fragmented teaching
and learning). Among these four companies, two are OEM joint ventures (Shanghai-VW and
Beijing Jeep), one is a set of auto component joint ventures (Delphi-China), and the other is an
R&D joint venture (PATAC). The cases represent a significant range in group-embeddedness of
R&D capabilities to be transferred. The R&D capabilities to be transferred within an OEM joint
venture are usually more group-embedded than those to be transferred within a component joint
venture. Similarly, the R&D capabilities to be transferred in a component joint venture that
produces complex products are more group-embedded than those to be transferred within a
component joint venture that makes simple products. The number of cases of R&D capability
transfer events among these four companies is sufficient for an in-depth theory-building
multiple-case study (Yin, 1994). Table 1 summarizes the companies. Appendix II provides a
detailed description of general operations and capability transfer practices of each company.
The third stage of the study involved interview follow-up. We verified the case write-ups
with the respondents. We also asked clarification questions by telephone during the fall of 2001.
We used multiple sources of evidence to achieve construct validity. We used multiple
data collection methods, including face-to-face interviews, field observations, telephone
interviews, and secondary sources of information about the company and the particular R&D
related projects of our interest. At each site, multiple respondents ranging from engineers to top
managers were interviewed individually to allow multiple perspectives on the same case of R&D
capability transfer. The respondents have experiences with multiple R&D capability transferWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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events and all four knowledge transfer strategies. This is especially valuable because it permits
the respondents to give comparisons of various strategies used in transferring R&D capabilities.
All interviewees in the second stage of this study are Chinese recipients of the R&D
capability transfer because we believe that, compared with the members of the source
community, those from the recipient community better understand the learning needs and
learning results. Each interview section lasted from 2 to 5 hours. The conversations of the
interview were hand written on site and then transcribed into a more formal format within 24
hours of the interview.
In each interview, we followed the same protocol to ensure reliability (Yin, 1994). The
protocol consists of three parts. First, an interview began with the interviewee’s personal
background and his/her perception of the development and status of R&D capabilities of the
company. In the second part, the interviewee was asked to give a detailed chronology of the
particular R&D project(s) he/she participated in that involved transferring R&D capabilities from
the source community (usually a multinational firm) to the recipient community. Lastly, more
specific and probing questions were asked to acquire the interviewee’s personal opinions about
knowledge strategies with regard to the effectiveness of transferring the collective knowledge
content of R&D capabilities. R&D capabilities include (1) hardware/software, such as CAE
workstations and design software, (2) individually-carried knowledge/skill, and (3) collective
knowledge, such as architectural knowledge, group-embedded R&D procedural knowledge, and
product-specific design language. The focal point of this paper is the collective knowledge
content within the R&D capabilities, which is the hardest to transfer (Spender, 1996).
Data Analysis
The main purposes of data analysis in theory-building case studies are sharpening
constructs and shaping propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989). To achieve these purposes, we used both
in-depth within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons to analyze field findings. We first
empirically refined constructs of the first set of strategic choice: collective teaching vs.
fragmented teaching, and then moved on to inductively derive propositions relating this strategic
choice with the perceived effectiveness of capability transfer activities. We repeated these steps
for the other set of strategic choices: collective learning vs. fragmented learning.
Under each discussion topic, we analyzed related case findings and interview transcripts,
which either confirm or expand the tentative constructs definitions or initial expectations of theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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relationship between constructs and effectiveness of capability transfer activities. Within-case
analysis was done through pooling responses of different respondents about one case, and then
generating an encompassing view of the case. We used cross-case analysis to analyze how the
respondents compared various R&D capability transfers and knowledge transfer strategies that
they had experienced personally. We also compared relevant literatures to our findings to
strengthen literal validity and widen generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989). The analytical process
was highly iterative between cross-case analysis and the generalization of constructs and
propositions. For the sake of clarity, we will focus on the final steps of the analytical process
rather than present every step of the iteration process.
FINDINGS
We present the findings in two major sections, strategies of transferring collective
knowledge from a (1) teaching perspective and (2) learning perspective, in line with the tentative
propositions we posed. In each section, we first present representative case findings under the
categories, which we derived through iterative within-case and cross-case analysis. We then
describe relevant literatures to support the case findings. Finally, we arrive at a set of general
propositions, which emerged from the cases.
I. Strategies of Transferring Collective Knowledge from the Teaching Perspective
The Constructs of Collective Teaching and Fragmented Teaching
At the beginning of this inquiry, we tentatively defined collective teaching as involving
the trainees in a learning-by-doing project in the working environment of the source community.
From the case analysis, we realize that this is only a necessary condition.
The sufficient conditions for collective teaching include two aspects. First, the source
community should allow the members of the recipient community access to the source
community’s day-to-day working environment and opportunities to observe their ways of
conducting business. Second, the members of the recipient community, upon given such access,
must have enough intent and communication ability to interact with the members of the source
community, while observing and reflecting on what they do and why they do it that way.
Overseas training of the Chinese employees in the home base of the foreign partner of the
joint venture does not always mean collective training. For example, a Delphi joint venture has
sent many of its Chinese engineers to its home base in the U.S. for three-month in-class training.
During this training, the Chinese trainees received instructions from many Delphi experts, butWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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did not have access to the day-to-day working environment of the source community. This kind
of training falls into the category of fragmented teaching.
On other occasions, even though Chinese trainees gained full access to the source
community when they participated in overseas training, because of their lack of intent or
communication capabilities, they did not gain as much collective knowledge as they might have
had they been able to learn from the entire source community. A Chinese manager from Delphi-
China who went through on-job training in Delphi’s home base in the U.S. had the following
observation, “Some Chinese engineers did not learn much during the overseas on-job training
because of their language problem or lack of inter-cultural communication skills, whereas others
learned a lot by asking questions of their American colleagues and observing how they handle
various issues.” She further commented on her own experiences, “Although I came to the US to
learn manufacturing technology, I was driven by curiosity and the demands of work to ask many
non-manufacturing questions. And I was surprised by their willingness and capabilities for
answering my questions. I also learned a great deal about how people from different areas
interact and coordinate with each other by observing the project team meetings. I would not have
learned these important things, had I not worked in the US with so many American colleagues.”
From this and other similar examples, we slightly revise our definition of collective and
fragmented teaching. We now view collective teaching as a process in which trainees are
exposed to the working environment of the source community and are encouraged to engage in
deep and broad interactions with relevant members of the source community for an extended
period of time. As a polar opposite of collective teaching, we define fragmented teaching as a
process in which trainees are not exposed to the working environment of the source community,
but only are given instructions and coaching from individual members of the source community.
Comparison Between Collective Teaching and Fragmented Teaching
The study suggests two insights concerning collective and fragmented teaching. First,
fragmented teaching is broadly used and, indeed, is the “base option” for transferring R&D
capabilities in almost all cases. Second, the importance of collective teaching is widely
acknowledged and the practice of collective teaching exists in all the companies we studied,
although to different degrees.
The R&D projects in the companies we studied have been mainly “intermediate-stage” or
“final-stage” R&D (Buckley & Casson, 1976). The projects include modifying or localizingWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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peripheral component design based on the vehicle platform designed by the source partner, in
order to adapt local road conditions, safety and environment regulations, and modifying styling
to meet local consumers’ taste. Although local R&D is not at a full-scale platform design (a
platform usually takes billions of dollars to develop and requires a volume of over one million
cars a year to offset the research cost), the work involves almost every stage of R&D from
market research to concept design to prototyping and validation. The R&D capabilities to be
transferred involve a high level of collective knowledge content. A Chinese top manager in
product development in Shanghai-VW described the typical understanding about what R&D
capabilities mean from the perspective of Chinese R&D managers, “R&D capabilities from my
perspective include how to translate initial design ideas from marketing research into a systemic
product design proposal, which guilds the various tasks, timelines, budgeting and specifications
for different function groups and coordination among these groups. R&D capabilities also imply
how effective we implement the product design proposal at various stages of the design process.
A large part of these capabilities lies in the experience of managers and engineers.” This is a
clear indication that collective content is significant in R&D capabilities that the firms want to
develop in these local companies.
We expected that collective teaching is a more effective mechanism in transferring
collective knowledge and would be adopted by companies that transfer R&D capabilities with
high collective knowledge content. Most interviews confirm this view.
The case that involves the greatest investment for developing local R&D capabilities is
Shanghai –VW’s 41-person overseas training program, which cost Shanghai-VW 1.8 million
marks. The goal of this project was to develop state-of-the-art R&D capabilities that span all
stages and aspects of vehicle development process within and through the team of 41 young
managers and engineers, who were selected carefully by the Shanghai-VW’s human resource
department. Twenty of the managers went to Germany for training in August 1998. The second
lot of 21 personnel went to Germany in September 1999. Upon their arrival in Germany, the
trainees first engaged in a six-month study of the German language and their own specialty in a
German university. They then transferred to VW AG’s vehicle development department to
receive training and participated in R&D projects, which included development of complete
vehicle, styling, chassis, engine, and body, as well as computer related projects. This on-job
training in Germany lasted for one year. Then the trainees then returned to Shanghai-VW andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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worked on local projects for a year. After that, they then returned to VW AG in Germany to
finish the last half year of the three-year training program. Before being sent to Germany, every
trainee signed a 15-year employment contract with Shanghai-VW to ensure that they will not
terminate the training before completion or leave Shanghai-VW soon after the training ends.
In addition to Shanghai-VW, all other cases we studied engaged in collective teaching to
different extents. Appendix II provides more details about the collective teaching mechanisms
the firms used.
 In general, each company we studied applied a mixture of fragmented and collective
teaching during the transfer of R&D capabilities. Previous empirical studies also presented cases
where a mixture of collective and fragmented teaching mechanisms were applied in transferring
organizational capabilities. For example, Brewer and Nollen described three mechanism adopted
by a HP-HCL (India) joint venture in transferring tacit and group-embedded process knowledge
in the early years of the joint venture: (1) teams of 10 HCL–HP engineers regularly spent 3 to 12
month periods at HP’s European headquarters in Germany, (2) a senior HP manager was the
head of manufacturing at HCL–HP for 3½ years, (3) an HP expatriate was head of R&D at
HCL–HP, and (4) several other HP technical experts were located in the joint venture in India
(Brewer et al., 1998). Among these mechanisms, the first is collective teaching, the rest fall into
the category of fragmented teaching.
When asked to compare collective teaching with fragmented teaching in their
effectiveness for transferring R&D capabilities, respondents from different companies several
knowledge-related advantages that collective teaching offers over fragmented teaching. From
these data, we used an open coding process (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) to identify three categories
of knowledge-related advantages of collective teaching: (1) tacit procedural knowledge within a
single function, (2) tacit procedural knowledge across various functions, and (3) communal
culture and mindset. All three categories share the conceptual underpinning of collective
knowledge, because each has both tacit and group-embedded dimensions.
In the first category (single-function tacit procedural knowledge), respondents mentioned
that collective teaching has advantages such as knowing the engineering language, getting better
views about engineering problems, and obtaining more in-depth and situational understanding
about solving problems in product design. In the second category (multiple-function tacit
procedural knowledge), the respondents brought up the benefits of collective teaching, such asWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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understanding the ways of cross-functional coordination and the overall framework of R&D
processes. In the third category (communal mindset), respondents mentioned that they learned
company and group culture, as well as the mindsets and heuristics underlying team decision
making as benefits of collective teaching over fragmented teaching.
An interesting finding from the fieldwork is that collective teaching enables members of
the recipient community to identify and eliminate that part of the collective knowledge they have
learned is idiosyncratic to the source community’s context before they transfer that knowledge
back to the recipient community. As a Chinese engineering manager from Delphi-China
observed, “A lot of product development practices are not based on pure science. There are a lot
of contextual and situational elements that are idiosyncratic to our foreign partner and are not
suitable to our environment back in China. For example, some steps of a product development
procedure were developed in the U.S. based on the capacity limits of a particular plant. Through
interacting with many American engineers who understand the original intention of this
procedure, we were able to identify these steps and removed it before the procedure was
transferred to China.”
In some cases, respondents claimed that collective teaching is not just advantageous, but
indispensable. A Chinese manager in the product development area of Shanghai-VW who
participated the 41-person training program commented, “At the beginning, we did not know a
lot about VW AG’s R&D process, we encountered a lot of difficulties in the learning process.
What were written in the training materials and operation manuals are not detailed enough to
cover all possible situations in the design process. And even if the written procedures cover
everything, each German engineer seems to have his own personal way in interpreting these
procedures. What we really need to learn is not the procedures, but the way of interpreting and
applying them. This type of knowledge would be impossible to obtain had we not come to VW
AG and work with German engineers on a daily basis.” Similarly, a Chinese manager from
Delphi-China mentioned, “Training overseas is absolutely necessary for Chinese employees. Had
we not gone to US for on-job training, we would never get to know organizational structures and
the way things work in Delphi. Training overseas is not only important for managers but also for
mid-level and lower-level engineers.” A Chinese engineering manager at PATAC expressed the
same idea, “If we did not send Chinese engineers for overseas training, we may learn from US
expatriates here in PATAC, but the learning would be much limited because individual teachingWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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cannot cover various contingencies and situations.” A Chinese senior manager at Beijing Jeep
also claimed that every Chinese engineer absolutely needs to go the foreign partner’s home base
to receive on-job training, and each training section should last long enough for the trainees to
gain deep understanding about the how to conduct a full-scale design project.
The notion of collective teaching arises in several related literatures. Collective teaching
is similar to Lave’s “legitimate peripheral participation” (Lave et al., 1991), and Nonaka and
Takeuchi’s “spiral of organizational knowledge creation” (Nonaka et al., 1995) in that learning
should involve participation in a community of practitioners. Previous empirical studies also
provide examples of collective teaching. A good example of collective teaching is Honda’s guest
engineer program in which the company transfers organizational capabilities to its supplier-
partners (MacDuffie & Helper, 1997). In this program, the supplier sends engineers to work on
design for manufacturing issues with Honda’s product designers.
Bridge Networks
A striking finding from the field extended the knowledge-related advantages of collective
teaching. Besides acquiring the collective knowledge, a non-knowledge-related benefit of
collective teaching exists. This benefit is the development of an inter-communal network
between the source and recipient communities during the overseas on-job training process.
The field evidence suggests that working in the source community even for a short period
of time can give members of the recipient community significant opportunities to interact with
various experts at the source community. These interactions during the process of collective
teaching can build two key elements for sustainable, high quality and timely communication
network between the source and the recipient communities: (1) inter-personal trust, and (2)
know-who, i.e., the understanding of who does what better and who is most willing to help. Trust
based on personal contact can enhance the quality of knowledge flow (Kale, Singh, &
Perlmutter, 2000) and the sustainability of the network, whereas know-who can optimize and
shorten the route of inter-communal information search. Therefore, collective teaching fosters a
trust-based and path-optimized knowledge-transfer infrastructure between the source and the
recipient communities. We refer to the infrastructure as a bridge network.
A Chinese manager of Shanghai-VW who participated the 41-person training project
brought up the issue of the bridge network as one of the key benefits of doing the overseas
training, “In order to continuously acquire R&D knowledge, knowing who knows what and whoWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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has the authority to answer various questions is very important. If everyone from the team of 41
persons knows 10 different VW experts, we would develop a network involving about 400
German experts at the end of the three-year training. As the training coming to the end and most
trainees returned to Shanghai-VW, the benefit of this network started to show. Trainees, working
in relevant positions now in Shanghai-VW, communicate frequently through this network via e-
mail and telephone with their German colleagues.”
In another case, a Chinese engineer of Delphi-China described the knowledge transfer
importance of inter-personal trust and the bridge network, “Human beings are emotional
creatures. Knowing each other through face-to-face contact, even in a very brief manner, can
qualitatively change the nature of information exchange. Overseas training only helped us to
start. In our everyday work here, new products, new customers and new processes keep coming
up. We have to keep a close contact with American engineers to operate properly. If I don’t have
this network, my work would be much tougher.”
In a similar vein, a Chinese manager at PATAC gave high remarks to the value bridge
network, “Overseas training gives us a windfall – a network connecting us and foreign experts.
You just cannot imagine how much easier it is for us to get information we need from American
personnel when we have personal relationship with them. It’s interesting that in the US, people
also go about their work based on guanxi
2. A good guanxi between a Chinese and an American
personnel means a informal and high quality information channel between them.”
A Chinese senior manager of Beijing Jeep also put great emphasis on inter-communal
communication channels, “It is very important to know whom you should contact across the
Pacific when a specific issue arises. Many solutions to technical issues can be boiled down to the
communication between a Chinese engineer and an American engineer. If you don’t know who
is the best person to talk to for a specific issue, you are in big trouble”.
Personal ties between members of source community and members of recipient
community can form in many ways. The mechanisms include long-term assignment of
expatriates from the source community to the recipient community, exchange of short-term visits
by source and recipient community members, and collective teaching/long-term on-site training
of the members of the recipient community.
Based on the interviews, the ties formed in the collective teaching case are the most
extensive, sustainable, and tailored to the knowledge needs of the members of a recipientWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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community. A bridge network is an inter-communal boundary-spanning infrastructure. It differs
from a boundary-spanning individual in its flatness and short path distance between the person
who holds the knowledge holder and the person who inquires about the knowledge. Boundary
spanning individuals are strongly linked to their colleagues and have extensive links outside their
subunits (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). In the case of inter-communal knowledge transfer, a
boundary spanner is usually an expatriate from the source community who has broad relations
with various experts in the source community and works in the recipient community either as a
manager or as a trainer.
Figure 1 shows the difference between these two inter-communal infrastructures, of
individual boundary-spanners and bridge networks. Fragmented training usually entails sending
expatriates from the source community to the recipient community, and thus fosters individual
boundary spanner infrastructures, in which members of the recipient community must go through
the boundary spanner to connect with relevant experts of the source community. Collective
teaching, however, allows members of the recipient community to form direct ties with various
experts of the source community.
In almost all the companies we studied, individual boundary spanners and bridge
networks co-existed. As an engineer from Delphi-China explained, “In my daily work, for most
of the time, I communicate with my American colleagues through email and telephone without
going through any intermediate supervision. Sometimes I ask my American supervisors here in
Delphi-China (expatriates) to help me locate the right person in the US to answer my questions
or help to solve my problems.” When comparing these two types of boundary-spanning
infrastructures, this engineer commented, “Certainly, the bridge network is more effective,
because it is very important to know who is the best person to ask for help. My American
colleagues have a very finely defined division of labor. If I did not find the right person to
answer my question at the first time, chances are the question would be passed on to the second
or even the third person. The more persons the question must pass through, the less the
motivation to answer it, and thus the less likely it got answered. If the question is presented to a
wrong person, you may either get a wrong answer or get no answer at all. So, if you have a
bridge network, you would always get a right and prompt answer. Our American supervisors
here in China have too many things to handle. In many cases they could not offer help or did not
know the right person they could refer us to for help.” It is clear that, when it exists, the bridgeWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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network is superior to individual boundary spanners not only because it is structurally flatter and
shorter in path distance, but also because its ties are supported by stronger inter-personal
personal trust and optimized by know-who developed during the collective teaching process.
Decades ago, organization scholars argued that key individuals are more cost effective
than a widespread communication across organizational or communal boundaries (Arrow, 1974;
March & Simon, 1958). Nowadays, with the help of information technology, a bridge network
has become almost as affordable as or even more cost effective than boundary spanners. As the
net benefit of flat communication over indirect communication becomes more significant,
organizations become flatter internally, and so do the inter-communal boundary spanning
infrastructures.
Situations Where Collective Teaching Is Not Preferred
The above discussion established that collective teaching is superior to fragmented
teaching for two reasons: acquiring collective knowledge embedded in the source community,
and establishing a bridge network between the source and the recipient community. Surprisingly,
however, some cases reveal situations in which collective teaching is not preferred over
fragmented teaching. In attempting to understand this seeming contradiction, we found an
extension to our tentative expectation of the superiority of collective teaching.
Among situations where collective teaching is not preferred, we found two dominant
reasons: transfer effort and limited group-embeddedness of R&D capabilities to be transferred.
Obviously, when managers formulate knowledge transfer strategies, they must evaluate the
financial cost and human effort of transfer (Teece, 1976), as well as the benefits of a particular
strategy (Mason, 1980; Schwartz, 1982). We define transfer effort as a combination of financial
cost and lost work hours from both the source and the recipient communities due to carrying out
a certain capability transfer strategy. The benefit or need of using collective teaching increases
with the level of group-embeddedness of the R&D capabilities to be taught is high. When the
extent of need exceeds the level of effort, collective teaching will be adopted.
Figure 2 depicts a view of managerial choice in selecting teaching strategies for
transferring a certain organizational capability. For simplicity, group-embeddedness of the
organizational capability to be taught is denoted as ΓΓΓΓ . In Zone I, where the level of ΓΓΓΓ  is low, the
benefit for collective teaching is low, and using collective teaching to achieve the same objective
of knowledge transfer that fragmented teaching can achieve is uneconomical. As the level of ΓΓΓΓWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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reaches Zone II, the benefit of collective teaching becomes significant. In other words, using
fragmented teaching to attempt to achieve the objective of knowledge transfer will incur higher
transfer effort than using collective teaching. To sum up, the higher the level of ΓΓΓΓ , the more
likely collective teaching is justified.
For example, one joint venture of Delphi-China produces electric wiring harnesses in
China. The products are not sophisticated and design and manufacturing processes are not cross-
functional or architectural. In other words, the level of ΓΓΓΓ  of this joint venture lies in Zone I. The
training of Chinese engineers is done entirely in China, by fragmented training. In contrast,
another joint venture of Delphi-China produces steering systems, which are more technically
sophisticated and demand cross-functional coordination in their complex development processes.
The level of ΓΓΓΓ  of its R&D capabilities to be transferred lies in Zone II. The Chinese employees
of this division were sent to the home base of Delphi in the US for on-job training, which is
collective teaching.
Propositions
Several propositions emerged from the discussions of collective and fragmented teaching.
Proposition 1a. In the context of acquiring organizational capabilities from the source
community, collective teaching helps the recipient community acquire collective
knowledge about the organizational capabilities of the source community.
Proposition 1b. In the context of acquiring organizational capabilities from the source
community, collective teaching helps establish bridge networks, which provide
communication channels between members of the source and recipient communities. In
contrast to collective teaching, fragmented teaching fosters individual boundary spanner
communication infrastructures, which are less effective than bridge networks in
transferring collective knowledge.
Proposition 1c. In the context of acquiring organizational capabilities from the source
community, the higher the group-embeddedness of the capabilities to be taught, the more
likely collective teaching will incur lower transfer effort than fragmented teaching and
will be adopted in practice.
Building on organizational learning arguments, we expected that collective teaching
provides opportunities for the members from the recipient community to gain collective
knowledge from the source community, which fragmented teaching cannot provide. The case
evidence supports this expectation. Moreover, the case study identified the bridge network as
another benefit of collective teaching. The case study also extended the initial expectation byWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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introducing two factors that affect the practitioners’ choice between collective and fragmented
teaching – transfer effort and the level of group-embeddedness of the knowledge.
II. Strategies of Transferring Collective Knowledge from the Learning Perspective
Constructs of Collective Learning and Fragmented Learning
Teaching strategies deal with how individual members of the recipient community
acquire knowledge from the source community. By contrast, learning strategies address how
individual learning integrates and re-embeds into the recipient community and forms new
collective knowledge adapted to the context of the recipient community. In short, teaching
strategies relate to the knowledge acquisition aspect and learning strategies to the knowledge
integration aspect of the knowledge transfer process.
In the theoretical foundation of this paper, we identified two categories of learning
strategies: collective and fragmented learning. A question arises at this point, concerning the
nature of collective learning. Does learning as a group necessarily means collective learning? In
particular, all the companies we studied have sent their employees for in-class training or
seminars for engineering or managerial courses. Is this training mechanism a type collective
learning? The answer is no.
From the case evidence, two key characteristics of collective teaching emerged:
synchronization of learning based on the pace of the R&D project that involved all trainees and
intense interaction among trainees during the training process. Interactions among members of a
recipient community lead to the formulation of transactive memory (Argote et al., 2000a;
Wegner, 1987), interpretation scheme (Daft et al., 1984; Levitt et al., 1988), common language,
and other group-level knowledge within this community (Brown et al., 1998; Cook et al., 1999).
Therefore, we define collective learning as a knowledge integration process in which trainees are
trained as a group with significant amount of interactions among each other such that transactive
memories and other group-level knowledge can be formed among them. This is similar to Kasl et
al.’s definition of synergetic team learning, which indicates “members create knowledge
mutually” and “divergent perspectives are integrated through dialectical processes that create
shared meaning schemes” (Kasl, Marsick, & Dechant, ).
As a polar opposite of collective learning, we define fragmented learning as a knowledge
integration process in which trainees’ lack of either or both of the key characteristics of
collective learning (i.e., synchronization of learning pace and significant interaction amongWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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learners). This is similar to Kasl et al.’s definition of the fragmented mode of team learning,
which implies “individuals learn separately, but the group does not learn as a holistic system”
(Kasl et al., ). Fragmented learning has been widely adopted by the practitioners in inter-
organizational knowledge transfer according to previous empirical studies (Liebrenz, 1982;
Reddy & Zhao, 1990). In most technology transfer agreements, the provision for training of the
members in the recipient organization is stated in measures such as “person-month of on-site
training”, which does not specify whether the training is carried out collectively or individually.
Comparison Between Collective Learning And Fragmented Learning
To avoid confounding the effects of teaching and learning strategies, we compare
collective learning and fragmented learning among cases that adopted collective teaching, i.e.,
local employees were sent to the home site of the source community for on-job training. Our
goal is to see whether sending the local employees for overseas training at the same time and on
the same project and with significant interaction among themselves (i.e., collective learning) is
better than sending them for overseas training at different times, or on different projects, or
without significant interaction among themselves (i.e., fragmented learning). Building on
organizational learning literatures (Argote et al., 2000a; Brown et al., 1998; Kogut et al., 1992;
Levitt et al., 1988), we expected collective learning to be more effective than fragmented
learning in transferring collective knowledge. As Kogut has argued, “the teaching of know-how
and information requires frequent interaction within small groups, often through the development
of a unique language or code. Part of the knowledge of a group is simply knowing the
information who knows what. But it also consists of how activities are to be organized, e.g., by
Taylorist principles” (Kogut, 1992:389). The evidence of the case study enriched the orienting
proposition by describing several benefits of collective learning over fragmented learning, as
well as identifying conditions when fragmented learning dominates collective learning.
Among the cases we studied, the strongest case of collective learning is Shanghai-VW’s
41-person overseas training project. A Chinese participant of this program described the nature
of collective learning using a metaphor of “the coupling of two pyramids”, saying that “Suppose
that the R&D team of VW AG is like a pyramid, each building block representing a particular
function and each layer of blocks representing a particular managerial level, we (i.e. the 41-
person team) have trainees from each building block at each layer work in the corresponding
block and layer of VW AG during our overseas training. It is as if our pyramid is coupled withWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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theirs.” In this training project, Chinese trainees not only worked in the unit of their specialty in
VW AG with the German experts, but also communicated frequently with other Chinese trainees
to coordinate related problems from the adjacent functions in the R&D process or to work on
architectural or systemic issues in R&D, such as data structure of the entire design, and
body/exterior dimensions, which affect the dimensions and mounting locations of sub-assemblies
and components.
Besides the formal job-related interactions during the work time, the Chinese trainees in
the Shanghai-VW program informally interacted with each other to share their learning and
discuss problems after work hours. Living in the same apartment building, coming from the same
cultural background, and speaking the same mother tongue promoted this informal interaction
among Chinese trainees. To enhance the collective learning during the overseas training, the
Chinese trainees also organized weekly meetings, to review what each one had learned in that
week. “We share knowledge learned and help each other to understand things from different
perspectives. We discuss especially how German engineers interpret situations and solve
problems, in other words, the things that are not written in manuals. The discussion among us
really helped me to understand my part of the business and what my Chinese colleagues are
doing in their parts of business”, explained one Chinese trainee. Upon returning to Shanghai-
VW, these 41 trainees formed the core of the local R&D force. The product development
manager credited the recent success in developing many local variations of the new vehicle
platform to the group-embedded R&D capabilities acquired from the 41-person training project.
In other cases, respondents also acknowledged the advantages of collective learning in
cultivating the group-level knowledge. For example, respondents from both Delphi-China and
PATAC mentioned that collective teaching helped them to cultivate cross-functional
collaboration among Chinese trainees. A respondent from PATAC commented that collective
teaching helped to develop a new culture that is neither Chinese nor American, but PATAC-
specific. Respondents also noted that if the trainees went overseas at the same time but for
different R&D projects, the coordination among the trainees would not be as strong as it would
be when they went to same project.
From the case evidence we also identified another benefit of collective learning,
efficiency of synchronization. In particular, if the trainees went overseas for training at different
times, there would be times when those who had received training had to work with those whoWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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had not received training. Many respondents complained about the difficulty of knowledge
sharing when this happened. The new ideas and mindsets brought back by those who completed
overseas training could not be diffused smoothly to the rest of the recipient community, who had
not acquired the mental framework needed to understand these ideas. A Chinese manager from
Beijing Jeep (BJC) admitted, “The reason that we haven’t achieve the level of R&D capability
that we should have achieved after so many years of effort is that we didn’t cultivate the ‘team
mindset’ about R&D among all engineers and managers. When those who have been trained
overseas came back to BJC, they usually found that it was difficult to diffuse what they learned
to their Chinese colleagues who had not gone there. Some aspects of R&D management cannot
be communicated and promoted unless everyone understands the logic behind them.”
To sum up, if sufficient numbers of engineers and managers undertake overseas training
at the same time and on same project, they gain group-level and synchronization benefits. They
gain group-level knowledge, which helps them cooperate after the training period is over and re-
embed the collective knowledge learned from the source community. In addition, they also
reduce the friction of knowledge diffusion that arises from unsynchronized fragmented learning.
Some previous studies of group learning have identified benefits of collective learning. In
an experiment of collective learning, for instance, Liang et al. (Liang, Moreland, & Argote,
1995) found that training employees in their work group as a whole is more effective than
training the employees individually. This indicates that collective learning can foster collective
memory and enable the development of collective knowledge more effectively.
Situations Where Collective Learning Is Not Preferred
Notwithstanding many benefits of collective learning, companies in this study other than
Shanghai-VW has adopted only small-scale collective learning efforts, rather than large-scale
programs. PATAC, Delphi-China and Beijing Jeep typically have sent their Chinese employees
for overseas on-job training either individually or in small groups. The main factor that affects
the selection of learning strategies, according to the respondents, is transfer effort. Sending a
sizable group of a local work force to another location for training as a team not only incurs
training and travel related costs, but also the loss of local productivity. As a Chinese manager
from PATAC explained, “We know that it would be ideal to get all of our engineers trained at
the same time, but we cannot afford it. We have to take a second best option, which is to take a
more incremental and long-term approach in training our local employees.”William Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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From the evidence, we identified another factor that affects the selection of learning
strategies, the need for future coordination among members of the recipient community, or in
other term, the group-embeddedness of the collective knowledge to be re-embedded in the
recipient community. As a Chinese manager from Delphi-China commented: “It is really costly
to do collective learning. However, if future collaborations among a group of R&D engineers are
really important, group-wide overseas training may be justified. In our case, each engineer is
responsible for one project, and communicates with his customers or American counterparts
more than he does with his Chinese peers. The cross-personal interaction among us is not very
high. So we do not feel necessary to do a group-wide overseas training.”
Figure 3 provides a view of managerial choice in selecting learning strategies for
transferring an organizational capability. For simplicity, group-embeddedness of collective
knowledge to be re-embedded in the recipient community is denoted as ΦΦΦΦ . In Zone I, where the
level of ΦΦΦΦ  is low, the need or benefit for collective learning is low, thus using collective learning
to achieve the same objective of knowledge integration or re-embedment is uneconomical. As
the level of ΦΦΦΦ  moves to Zone II, the need or benefit of collective learning becomes significant,
and using fragmented learning to achieve the objective of knowledge integration or re-
embedment at a high level of ΦΦΦΦ  will incur high transfer effort. In other words, the higher the
level of ΦΦΦΦ , the more likely collective learning will occur.
For example, most Delphi joint ventures emphasize enabling local engineers to
coordinate effectively with their foreign counterparts, rather than developing local R&D
capabilities. In these cases, the level of ΦΦΦΦ  is low and lies in Zone I; these joint ventures do not
engage in collective learning. In contrast, Shanghai-VW has set a clear objective of developing
indigenous capabilities of developing and localizing vehicle designs. In other words, the
expected level of ΦΦΦΦ  is high and falls into Zone II. Collective learning was adopted as the Chinese
R&D engineers were sent to VW AG for on-job training as a team.
Propositions
Several propositions emerged from the discussions of collective and fragmented learning.
Proposition 2a. In the context of integrating and re-embedding organizational
capabilities in the recipient community, collective learning assists prompt development of
group-level knowledge (such as routines and transactive memories) required for future
collaboration within the recipient community.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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Proposition 2b. In the context of integrating and re-embedding organizational
capabilities in the recipient community, collective learning offers advantages of
synchronized learning.
Proposition 2c. In the context of integrating and re-embedding organizational
capabilities in the recipient community, the higher the group-embeddedness of collective
knowledge, the more likely collective learning will incur lower transfer effort than
fragmented learning and will be adopted in practice.
In this section, we considered the superiority of collective learning over fragmented
learning in transferring collective knowledge. The case evidence supports the expectation, drawn
from organizational learning theory, that collective learning can provide opportunities for the
members from the recipient community to re-embed collective knowledge learned from the
source community into the recipient community. The case study also extended the initial
expectation by introducing two factors that affect the decision makers’ choice between collective
and fragmented learning – transfer effort and the group-embeddedness of collective knowledge
to be re-embedded in the recipient community.
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This study explores strategic issues in inter-communal transfer of collective knowledge
with a group-level epistemological perspective (Cook et al., 1999). Aligned with the group-
embeddedness dimension of collective knowledge, the group-level perspective directs our
attention to both the source and recipient communities, and further leads to two sets of strategic
choices concerning the transfer of collective knowledge from both teaching and learning
perspectives: collective vs. fragmented teaching, and collective vs. fragmented learning. The
theory-guided inductive approach ensures a solid connection among initial theoretical
expectations, empirical findings, and the empirically validated theoretical framework.
The transfer of organizational capabilities across group boundaries implies two essential
aspects: (1) acquiring group-embedded tacit knowledge of the source community by the
individual learners of the recipient organization, and (2) integrating and re-embedding the
individual learning among the learners to form the capabilities needed within the recipient
community (Levitt et al., 1988). Different teaching and learning strategies address different
needs for knowledge acquisition and knowledge integration. Although we discussed these
strategies separately for the clarity in concept development and framework explanation, in
practice every capability transfer event involves both knowledge acquisition and knowledge
integration and thus requires a combination of teaching and learning strategies.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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Figure 4 depicts four different configurations of teaching-learning strategies. The choice
of teaching strategies is orthogonal to that of the learning strategies. In other words, adopting
collective teaching in a capability transfer project does not necessarily demand the adoption of
collective (or fragmented) learning in the same project. Each configuration may imply multiple
strategic mechanisms in practice. The figure lists typical examples of mechanisms. For a
capability transfer event, depending on the extent of group-embeddedness of the collective
knowledge to be taught and the that to be re-embedded in the recipient community, teaching and
learning strategies will be selected based on the transfer effort required for the configuration.
Contributions and Empirical Implications
There are three key findings. First, collective teaching, or having members of the
recipient community work in the source community for an extended period, helps members of
the recipient community understand the collective knowledge embedded in the source
community. This opportunity will not be available if firms adopt only fragmented teaching. This
finding confirms the theoretical expectation derived from organizational learning theory.
The second finding is a surprise from the field. Comparing to fragmented teaching,
collective teaching offers the additional benefit of cultivating a bridge network, which serves as a
direct, trust-based, and sustainable communication infrastructure between the source and the
recipient communities. Fragmented teaching alone, by contrast, fosters individual boundary
spanner communication infrastructures, which often are indirect and less tailored to the needs of
the knowledge recipients. This finding leads to a theoretical recombination of epistemology and
network arguments, and suggests that when studying the outcome of knowledge transfer
activities, one should look for not only knowledge-related outcomes, but also communication
infrastructure-related outcomes.
The third finding is that collective learning enhanced the re-embedding of collective
knowledge acquired from the source community into the recipient community. This confirms the
theoretical expectation derived from organizational learning theory.
At a more fundamental level, two overarching frameworks emerged from the empirical
insights. In the practice of knowledge transfer, cost-effectiveness is a major concern of the
practitioners. The level of group-embeddedness of the knowledge to be transferred affects the
relationship among the transfer effort of different types of transfer strategies. The first
framework (Figure 2), relates transfer effort of various teaching strategies and the level of groupWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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embeddedness of capability to be taught (Γ ), and indicates that the higher the level of Γ , the more
likely that collective type of teaching strategy will become more cost-effective than fragmented
type of teaching strategy. Similarly, the second framework (Figure 3), relates transfer effort of
various learning strategies and the level of group embeddedness of capability to be re-embedded
into the recipient community (Φ ), and indicates that the higher the level of Φ , the more likely
that collective type of learning strategy will become more cost-effective than a fragmented
learning strategy. We note, however, that when the framework indicates that collective teaching
(or learning) incurs less transfer effort than fragmented teaching (or learning), collective teaching
will not necessarily replace fragmented teaching. Instead, in practice, collective teaching usually
serves to supplement the more common fragmented teaching as need arises.
The empirical setting of this study is significant in its own right. The auto industry is the
pillar industry of China and the Chinese auto market is the largest growing market in the world.
As China’s WTO entry approaches, one of the urgent items for multinational firms’ operations in
China is to develop local R&D capabilities. Previous empirical studies show that personnel from
less developed countries need not only a broad coverage of various stages and aspects of project
preparation, implementation and operation, but also need a higher level understanding of why
things are managed in certain ways (Marton, 1986). This study provides practitioners with a rich
description of the best practices and lessons learned in transferring organizational capabilities
and, moreover, a theoretical framework that can help them to formulate their own strategies for
transferring organizational capabilities. Although the research setting is about R&D capability
transfer in Chinese auto industry, the logic can be directed at more general issues of enabling
factors for effective inter-communal transfer of collective knowledge, through the use of analytic
generalization in case methods (Yin, 1981). Literature enfolding also enhances the level of
generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The empirical implications of this study lie in two aspects: (1) explaining the success or
failure of the past events of capability transfer and (2) providing guidelines for practitioners to
formulate future capability transfer strategies. Both practitioners and theorists have realized the
enormous difficulties and high rate of failures in transferring capabilities either across the
boundary of business lines or across the boundary of organizations. The study indicates that root
causes of transfer failure lie in the areas of knowledge acquisition and knowledge integration. IfWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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the teaching and learning strategies are formulated according to the group-embeddedness of the
capabilities to be taught and to be re-embedded, the chance of failure will decline.
Limitations And Future Research
There is much room for future work to build on this exploratory study. We note two
issues. First, measures such as transfer effort, scale of collective teaching and learning, and the
level of group-embeddedness of knowledge to be transferred or re-embedded need to be further
sharpened and operationalized for theory testing. Second, we did not examine the coupling effect
of teaching strategies and learning strategies. Each organization we studied typically used a
mixture of these configurations. In the future research, each configuration deserves separate
study, while the relationships among these configurations with regard to the transfer effort and
sequence of usage also merit close examination.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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Endnotes
1. Spender uses a “social/individual” distinction instead of “group/individual”, emphasizing
overall embeddedness rather than the distinction between communal and social embeddedness.
We consider that the term collective knowledge can mean group tacit knowledge, in the group
genre of Cook and Brown (Cook et al., 1999).
2. Guanxi is the Chinese word for “personal relationship” (see Tsui & Farh, 1997; Luo, 1997).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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Appendix I. Chinese Auto Industry And The International Transfer Of R&D Capabilities
As we noted earlier, we selected the activities of transferring R&D capabilities in
Chinese auto industry as the empirical setting for this study. There is growing evidence that
MNEs transfer R&D capabilities to their joint ventures in this industry. Moreover, there are
significant technological, cultural, and managerial distances between the source organizations,
which are foreign MNEs, and the recipient organizations, which are the IJVs of the MNEs in
this industry. This large asymmetry between the two alliance partners indicates substantial
potential for inter-partner learning (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000). The industry
provides a natural setting for studying how firms apply their network knowledge stock and
design their inter-partner network structure to overcome transfer difficulties and achieve
effective capability transfer.
When China’s auto industry opened to foreign investors in the early 1980’s, its R&D
capability in passenger car sector was weak. State owned enterprises (SOEs) in this sector were
initially formed to produce commercial vehicles rather than passenger vehicles. SOEs were
characterized by low R&D effort (R&D spending was less than 1% of revenue, far lower than
R&D by MNEs) and long platform upgrade cycles (usually longer than 20 years).
The Chinese government considers the auto industry as a pillar industry and Chinese
industrial policy gives strong emphasis on developing indigenous R&D capabilities. The
approval guidelines for foreign MNEs’ to establish IJVs in the Chinese auto industry involve
several key provisions concerning technical development (The State Administration of
Machinery Industry, 1995). The IJV must have an internal technical center, which is capable of
developing future generations of products. Moreover, the products of the IJV must quickly reach
global technological levels. The industrial policy makers of this industry also gave strategic
guidelines for developing indigenous R&D capabilities (The State Administration of Machinery
Industry, 1995): (1) vehicle OEMs should take 5% to 10% of total reinvestment into developing
or expanding their tech centers; (2) R&D spending should reach 2% to 3%of sales; and (3) key
component suppliers should apply 10% to 20% of their reinvestment to set up their R&D
facilities and technical centers. The government also provides financial and taxation support for
joint R&D projects among business groups.
MNEs have recognized the potential of the emerging car market in China since the early
1980s. AMC-Jeep (later acquired by Chrysler) and VW were the first two MNEs to enter China.
They entered with cautious attitudes about the industrial infrastructure and local market, and only
established simple vehicle assembly facilities with low local content and near-to-zero local
knowledge content. The big commercial success of VW in the late 1980s and early 1990s evoked
an inflow of foreign investment in both vehicle OEM and supplier sectors. In order to earn the
approval to enter China, MNEs now must commit to bring in modern product/process
technologies and help develop indigenous R&D capabilities at their local operations.
China’s demand for R&D capability transfer does not necessarily contradict with the
long-term vision of MNE investors. As competition in the host countries’ markets becomes more
global and intense, new products that suit local tastes and regulations need to be developed at a
faster pace. Transferring R&D capabilities to operations close to local markets then becomes
beneficial (Buckley et al., 1976). MNEs’ R&D activities in the LDCs are mostly at the end stage
of the R&D cycle, with tasks such as adapting the general design to the local environment
validating the product capability of local supplier, and validating the localized product design to
meet the quality, safety and environmental requirements. The design adaptation/localizationWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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process ranges from extending the length of the car to re-designing the exterior and interior. GM-
Shanghai, for example, made over 600 engineering changes to tailor Buick Century to Chinese
driver preference, road conditions, and local gasoline quality.
It is understandable that at the early stage of acquiring R&D capabilities, the recipient
will not be entrusted with full-blown R&D projects for market purposes, even with the assistance
of expatriates from the source firm. In the auto industry, R&D projects involve many different
levels of difficulty. The most extensive R&D activity is the development of a new platform,
which includes styling, redesign of power train and key subassemblies and components. This
kind of project usually costs more than a billion dollars for each platform and needs production
volume exceeding a million vehicles a year to recover the R&D costs. Obviously, this is not a
feasible starting task for the recipient firm to work on. And, in reality, the source organizations,
which usually are MNEs from the industrialized countries, do not intend to hand over knowledge
of this kind of activity to their partners in LDCs. The realistic tasks for both the recipient and the
source firms lie in the R&D activities with lower degree of difficulty and narrower scope. Most
joint R&D tasks between local recipients and the multinational source firms in the Chinese auto
sector limit themselves to recombining local knowledge with the MNE’s general knowledge, that
is, to carry over an existing platform developed by the MNE and modify style, dimensions, and
parameters of some components based on local customer taste, driving conditions, and
government regulations. This type of task, although relatively simple, still calls for a great deal
of coordination among functional groups such as marketing, analysis, design, prototype,
validation, and production. Engaging in these tasks can expose the recipients to a large portion of
R&D routines and different stages of R&D process.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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Appendix II. Operating And Capability Transfer Practices Of The Companies
I. Shanghai-VW
Shanghai-VW, a joint venture among Shanghai Automobile Industrial Corporation
(SAIC), Bank of China, China Automobile Industrial Corporation (CAIC), and VW AG, has a
total employment of 10,000 and total registered capital of 2.3 billion RMB (277 million US
dollars), in which VW has a 50% share. Its annual output reached 200,000 cars in 1999 and took
over 60% of the market share in China’s mid-size car sector. The duration for the initial joint
venture contract is 25 years. Both Chinese and German partners are willing to extend the contract
for another 25 years.
Shanghai-VW started its production in 1985 with a single product, Santana, which was an
out-dated model even at the time of market introduction in China. However, due to the huge
market demand and lack of sizable competitors in the local market, Shanghai-VW has enjoyed
relatively secure market dominance and above-normal return without re-introducing a new car
model until the mid-1990s. During the early years of Shanghai -VW, the venture devoted most
effort to localizing component production, improving production management and quality, and
reducing cost. In 1995, Shanghai -VW passed the QS9001 qualification. Its local content of
production increased from less than 5% in 1985 to over 90% in 1997.
From the beginning of Shanghai-VW, both Chinese and German sides have had a clear
vision of the importance of training the local engineering and technical force. Soon after
Shanghai -VW was established, the German partner took the lead in developing and supervising
training programs. A training center was developed with German investment of 1.63 million
German marks and Chinese investment of 2 million RMB. This training center has been
continuously refurbished and improved over the past few years. It is now the highest quality
training facility in China’s auto sector, with training capabilities for product, manufacturing, and
R&D. The classes include CAD, exterior modeling, manufacturing technologies, automatic
control, automotive electronics, engineering analysis, and network information systems. The
training center has sent ten Chinese instructors to the training department of VW for training. By
1998, 1,060 Chinese personnel from Shanghai -VW had received technical training from the
training center. Shanghai -VW’s overall long-term training plan includes areas such as
professional training, general training, project-focused training, on-job training, qualifying
exams, leadership training, and overseas training (Lu, 2001). In addition to the in-class training,
based on the technology transfer agreement of the JV, for every key technical collaboration
projects between the Chinese and German partners, Shanghai -VW sends engineering and
technical personnel to related VW engineering or manufacturing units for on-job training.
In mid-1990s, as more multinational auto manufacturers entered China through joint
ventures, the local market competition heated up, which threatened Shanghai -VW’s market
dominance in China’s mid-size car sector. After almost ten years’ of single product operation,
Shanghai -VW realized that it was time to introduce new generations of products. In 1997, a
modified model of Santana and a Santana 2000 were introduced. The major work development
of Santana 2000 was done in VW-Brazil. However, Chinese engineers in Shanghai -VW
participated heavily in the exterior styling design of this car model.
As China’s entry into WTO approaches, Shanghai -VW realizes that product
development cycle must significantly shortened, and the cost for new product launching must be
significantly reduced. This new challenge has led Shanghai -VW to shift more strategic emphasisWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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toward developing local R&D capabilities. A ten-year plan for developing local R&D
capabilities has been established and launched. The goal is to bring the local R&D capabilities to
a higher level in order to achieve concurrent and multiple-project R&D, i.e., “manufacturing
generation I, developing generation II, and planning for generation III simultaneously”. As a first
step, SHANGHAI-VW invested 0.8 billion RMB (about 100 million US dollars) to expand its
technical center to include prototyping and testing facilities that are indispensable to the vehicle
development. At the next stage, taking the joint development of the Chinese version of Passat, a
popular compact car initially developed in Germany as a learning platform, Shanghai -VW
engaged in a large-scale knowledge transfer campaign, which involves Chinese personnel from
plant floor to top management, including 765 persons or 1,660 person-month overseas training.
The major R&D work on the Chinese version of Passat is in exterior and body extension.
German engineers do the major design work and technical validation in Germany, Chinese
engineers from Shanghai-VW participated in design proposal stage. Some state-of-art CAD
tools, such as dynamic structural design are used in the Passat project. There are 450 R&D-
related personnel in Shanghai -VW, whereas in VW AG there are over 8,000. Shanghai -VW
plans to increase R&D-related personnel to 1,000 over the next 4 or 5 years.
II. Delphi-China
Delphi Automotive Systems is the world’s largest auto supplier. It established a
representative office in Beijing in 1994, while Delphi was still part of the General Motors
Corporation. Since then, Delphi has established 9 joint ventures and 3 wholly owned enterprises
in China. The main purpose of these operations is to supply to the Chinese operations of its OEM
customers, such as GM-North American operation and GM-Opel. By the end of 2000, Delphi’s
overall investment in China exceeded 400 million US dollars, while its total sales also reached
400 million US dollars. The products in its Chinese operations range from electronic instruments
and batteries to brakes and steering systems. In 1999, the holding company of all Delphi’s
Chinese operations was established in Shanghai.
Delphi has been developing its Chinese business based on five principles: (1) long-term
cooperation, (2) actively transferring technologies, (3) promoting localization of design and
production, (4) promoting internationalization through exporting, and (5) serve multiple OEMs.
In order to better transfer technologies and localize design, Delphi cooperated with Tsinghua
University, a leading university in China, and established Delphi-Tsinghua Institute (DTI) in
1996 in Beijing. DTI offers a large range of technical and managerial training programs, such as
ISO/QS quality systems, lean manufacturing, automotive engineering, leadership, human
resources, project management, and corporate culture. The trainers of DTI include professors
from Tsinghua University, Peking University, Chinese Academy of Science, and experts from
Delphi Automotive Systems. By June of 2000, DTI has provided training for over 8,000 person-
weeks for more than 200 customers. DTI serves as “the premier training center in China,
bridging industry, government and academia to meet their needs.”
Besides DTI, Delphi also uses other mechanisms to transfer technologies and capabilities
to its Chinese operations. Depending on the need of individual operations, some of Delphi’s
China operations invite foreign experts to be managers and trainers in China, some send Chinese
engineers and managers for overseas training in Delphi’s various divisions around U.S., and
some use both approaches. Delphi Parker-Shanghai, which produces electric harnesses, adopted
an all-American managerial team at the beginning. An American manager, who was also
responsible to mentor his/her Chinese successor, headed every functional unit. In about sixWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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months, half of the American managers finished their mentoring job and transferred their
leadership to Chinese successors. Now, Chinese nationals fill almost all mid and low-level
managerial jobs. Delphi-Steering Systems, which produces steering systems and half shafts, has
sent all of its Chinese engineers and managers to its home base in Saginaw, Michigan for on-job
training, ranging from 3 months to over a year. In contrast, Delphi-Energy, which produces
engine accessories, did not send its Chinese engineers for overseas training.
III. PATAC
GM entered China in 1997 with five principles: (1) GM is committed to China for the
long term in a relationship that benefits GM, China and the Chinese people, (2) GM is involved
in the production, distribution, design and testing of vehicles, (3) GM is actively engaged in
technology exchange programs needed to develop the Chinese automobile industry, (4) GM is
committed to fostering the managerial and professional skills of its local Chinese employees, and
(5) GM ensures its operations in China are globally integrated to secure the highest quality,
services and products for the Chinese market. Based on the fourth and fifth princes, GM not only
set up two manufacturing joint ventures, but also a R&D joint venture – Pan Asia Technical
Automotive Center (PATAC), which is a US $50 million, 50-50 automotive engineering and
design center joint venture between GM and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC).
The goal for establishing PATAC is to develop and expand China’s automotive engineering and
design capabilities while serving as an advanced technical center for the region. Acting as a fully
separate business entity from its parents, PATAC offers a comprehensive range of design,
analysis, and testing services, including computer-aided five-axis exterior model making,
simulated road testing, and engine emission testing. Its facilities are available not only to GM
and SAIC but also to all automotive companies in China and the Asia-Pacific region. PATAC
has about 250 employees, including 160 engineers, designers, scientists, and technicians. Many
of these professionals have been drawn from auto manufacturers in the area. However, the
Center has an open employment policy that allows it to hire overseas trained personnel to keep
the Center ahead of technical advances.
In June 1999, PATAC unveiled its first small-size concept car, Qilin, representing a
major accomplishment for automotive design in China. Qilin was designed to demonstrate the
full range of design and testing capabilities offered by PATAC. Soon after the completion of
Qilin project, the same team of R&D personnel engaged in a localization R&D project based on
an existing small-size car, Corsa, which was developed originally in Europe. The localization
R&D involves tasks such as redesigning heating and air conditioning system, as well as
modifying engine control system to fit local road and fuel conditions and meet local regulations.
The localized Corsa is named Sai-ou, and was successfully launched for production in 2001.
IV. Beijing Jeep
Beijing Jeep Corporation Ltd (BJC) is a 58-42 joint venture between Beijing Auto Work
(BAW) and Daimler-Chrysler. BJC employs 8,200 personnel, in which about 10 managers and
engineers are expatriates from Daimler-Chrysler. Before the formation of BJC, its Chinese
partner had been producing an off-road vehicle without major design change from 1964 to 1984.
Developing a new generation of off-road vehicle that suits the Chinese market was an urgent task
for BAW, and was written as a key provision into the joint venture contract between the two
partners of BJC. Soon after the formation of the BJC, a team of Chinese engineers was sent to
the tech center of AMC in Detroit, with a plan to use the platform design of the AmericanWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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partner’s CJ-7 to develop an off-road vehicle platform that suited the Chinese market. However,
the design effort failed. According to the Chinese R&D manager, the failure was due to an
inability to assimilate the vehicle design.
In 1988, BJC developed an off-road vehicle based on an existing truck platform from
AMC, but ended at the concept stage. Four years later, BJC took on another round of R&D
effort. This time, it spent 15 months and 2.8 million US dollars and utilized Chrysler’s core
platform design and R&D process. This effort again ended without commercialization because
the design could not meet with the market and cost requirement, but the engineers agree that this
R&D project gave them invaluable experiences in R&D management and the understanding of
core technologies of the platform on which they would base their modified design.
From 1984 to 1996, BJC made multiple efforts to develop the next generation off-road
vehicle with the help of the American partner and other foreign design companies. Although the
task goal was not fulfilled, BJC accumulated experiences in vehicle design and R&D project
management. The most valuable outcome of these efforts, according the R&D manager of the
CP, is an experienced R&D team that can take on different functions of a R&D project. In
articulating the content of the experience, this manager pointed out that it is the “stream of
thought” in managing R&D processes, and the understanding of what design content of the
original foreign product needs to be modified with the recombination of local market, supplier,
and technological knowledge to generate a commercially viable product for the local market.
After a 12-year “learning period”, BJC launched a new vehicle design project in 1996.
This time, BJC adopted an advanced R&D management process to control timing, budgeting,
and personnel movement, with the help of its American partner and other foreign design
companies. The R&D project started from market research, and then entered into concept design
stage with the concurrent collaboration among product design, quality control, finance,
purchasing, and manufacturing departments. The design was proven and the first prototype
vehicle was assembled and tested by the end of 1999. The formal production date was projected
for 2002. Although the time taken for this round of R&D is long compared to current Western
standards (2 to 4 years for new vehicle design), considering the amount of indigenous knowledge
and managerial content that have been embedded into the new product and the extent of
experience gained by the design team, this project was a major breakthrough for BJC.
During the 16 years of BJC, although the Chinese partner has had the intent of acquiring
R&D capability, the joint management of the joint venture failed to formulate a systematic
strategy on training R&D personnel. The joint venture has used three types of overseas training.
The first type is overseas on-job training of teams of design managers and engineers with
specific design projects, which can either for entire vehicle design or component design. The
number of Chinese engineers in each training team ranges from 3 to 10, with the length of each
training section span from 3 months to over a year depending on the size of the project. The
second type of training is overseas formal engineering education but, in BJC’s history, only eight
Chinese engineers have received a one-year college-level engineering training from General
Motors Institute (now, Kettering University). The third type of training involves sending
individual engineers or managers to work full time as resident-engineers in the home base of the
American partner for as long as a year. Eight Chinese employees have received this type of
assignment. In recent years, since Daimler acquired Chrysler, overseas training has fallen.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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Table 1. Summary Of The Companies Studied
Shanghai-VW Pan Asia Technical
Automotive Center (PATAC)
Delphi-China Beijing-Jeep Co. (BJC)
Chinese Partner SAIC, Bank of China, and
CAIC
SAIC 9 different Chinese auto
suppliers
Beijing Auto Work
Foreign Partner VW AG, Germany General Motors, USA Delphi Auto System, USA Daimler-Chrysler, Germany
Initial Registered Capital   19 million US$ 50 million US$ N/A 147 million US$
Total Initial Investment 119 million US$ 50 million US$ Over 400 million US$ by
2000.
411 million US$
Equity Share SAIC: 25%




GM:    50%
Delphi: Varies from 40% to
100%. Delphi has 9 joint
ventures and 3 wholly
owned operations in China
BAW: 58%
D-C:   42%
Year of Establishment 1985 1997 Varies from 1995 to 1998 1983
Length of JV Contract 25 years 30 years Varies from 30 to 50 years 20 years
Location Shanghai Shanghai Various locations around
China
Beijing, China
Main Product VW brand compact
vehicles and auto
components.
Automotive R&D services, ranging
from localization of foreign vehicle




systems to electric harness.
Cherokee SUV
Chinese brand SUV
Annual Capacity 300,000 vehicles N/A Total sales of Delphi-China
reaches 400 million US$ in
2000.
About 80,000 vehicles
Sources: The data draw from “Summary & Guide of Foreign Enterprises in China Automotive Industry”, published in 1998. Some
performance data use 1996 statistics.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
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Figure 2. Framework For Comparing Cost Effectiveness Of Collective
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Figure 3. Framework For Comparing Cost Effectiveness Of Collective
And Fragmented LearningWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 420
42












e Group on-job training of members of the
recipient community at the site of the
source community
Lecturing or demonstration by the members of the
source community in team-oriented training
seminars attended by the members of the
recipient community (at either the site of the
recipient community or that of the source
community)
Sending expatriates from the source community to
manage or train the members of the recipient































Individual on-job training of the
members of the recipient community at
the site of the source community
Lecturing or demonstration by the members of the
source community in individual-oriented training
seminars attended by the members of the
recipient community
One-on-one apprenticeship between a member
from the source community and a member from
the recipient community (at either the site of the
recipient community or that of the source
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